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Abstract
Nowadays, a security regime for protecting nuclear and radiological material—providing an intelligent
national regulatory institution and establishing national security laws—is necessary in order for a state to
ensure security of nuclear and radiological materials used within its borders.
This paper focuses on discussing the opportunities and challenges facing the future of nuclear security
after the creation of the new Moroccan Agency of Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security.

I.

Introduction:

Considering the benefits of using nuclear and radiological materials to support civilian needs across
different areas of society, and considering the rise of nuclear terrorism (especially in the context of a
concrete terrorist threat), nuclear security regimes should aim to strike an equilibrium between the secure
management of those radiological and nuclear materials and the pursuit of activities that are beneficial to
humanity.
More than ever, nuclear security regimes are critical quests not only for the countries developing nuclear
programs, but also for countries developing applications using radioactive sources and nuclear material in
medicine, industry, food, water, research, and other fields.
Nuclear security is essential because, as well, nuclear security measures maintain an objective of
protecting human life, while also preserving health and the environment.
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Therefore, all nations should ensure that such security is not compromised; considering the current global
political situation, it cannot be ruled out that nuclear material and other radioactive material could be used
for malicious purposes.
For this reason, Morocco is now more aware than ever of the importance of enhancing its nuclear security
regime in order to better secure nuclear and radiological material and prevent the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD), as manifested in its creation of the new Moroccan Agency of Nuclear and
Radiological Safety and Security, per law 142-12.
Additionally, herein, we will highlight the discussion of the future of nuclear security throughout
Moroccan territory after the creation of the new Moroccan agency. We will also discuss the different
opportunities and challenges facing the development of nuclear security while paying mind to study the
new law, 142-12, concerning the safety and security of nuclear and radiological material.

II.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear and Radiological Material
Within Moroccan Borders:

Since the 1970s, nuclear and radiological material has been developed and used in Moroccan territory to
support the development of civilian activities.
Apart from the nuclear research reactor TRIGA of 2 MW hosted in the CNESTEN, which is being used to
support the production of I-136 and for research—such as the investigation of Mo-99 and another
radioisotope—there is, in Tangier, also a category-1 radioactive source: the cobalt-60. This source has a
maximum capacity of approximately 100,000 curies, and more than 70 percent of radiological material
between 15 percent and 17 percent is used in industry, including category-2 radiological material such as
selenium-75 and iridium-192.
According to statistics produced by the new Moroccan agency, Morocco hosts more than 2,400 pieces of
equipment used in the medical field, including a large number of radiological devices and scanners.

III. International Conventions and Treaties Ratified By
Morocco:
Enhancing security of nuclear and radiological materials to a higher level, thus preventing the
proliferation of WMDs and combating and preventing nuclear terrorism threats, is states’ top priority. At
the international level, Morocco has ratified several international conventions, including treaties (see
figure 1).
Table 1. Some Conventions and Treaties Ratified by Morocco

Treaties /
Conventions / TC
Treaty on the NonProliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
(T.N.P)
Application of
safeguards in the
framework of the
Treaty on the NonProliferation of
Nuclear Weapons
Additional Protocol

Codes Entry into
force
5/03/1970

Date of signature by
Morocco
1/07/1968

Ratified by Morocco
30/07/1970

Applicable to
Morocco
27/11/1970

18/02/1975

Janv.1973

18/02/1975

30/01/1993

16/06/2004

22/09/2004

5/03/2011

21/04/2011
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Agreement on the
Privileges and
Immunities of the
IAEA
Convention on Early
Notification of a
Radiological or
Nuclear Accident
Convention on
Assistance in the
Case of a
Radiological or
Nuclear Accident
Convention on
Nuclear Safety
Joint Convention on
the Management of
Spent Fuel and on
the Safety of
Radioactive Waste
Management
Convention on the
Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material
Amendment of the
Convention on the
Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material

30/03/1977

17/12/1976

27/10/1986

26/09/1986

28/05/1993

7/11/1993

26/02/1987

26/09/1986

28/05/1993

7/11/1993

24/10/1996

1/12/1994
29/09/1997

18/06/ 2001

18/06/ 2001

25/07/1980

23/08/2002

22/09/ 2002

10/12/2015

8/05/2016

8/02/1987

8/05/2016

IV. National Legal Framework and Regulations:
A.

Introduction

Advancing the nuclear security regime nationally provides the legal and institutional framework to protect
nuclear and radiological materials during their transport, use, and storage, and these concerns, as well as
waste management, are increasingly central in attempts to strengthen and enhance national security.
Nuclear security is particularly critical in today’s international security environment, which is
characterized by states’ increased independence within a more globalized world and by growing threats
from subnational groups and terrorist networks that could exploit the benefits of the international
community’s openness and interconnectedness for criminal purposes [1].
Protecting nuclear and radiological material without forgetting nuclear facilities is an effective and
efficient way to prevent, detect, and deter any operation to steal nuclear and radiological materials.
Additionally,, among the most serious challenges facing nuclear security efforts are the striking contrast
between the amount of material that would be required to produce a nuclear explosive device (several
kilograms) and the quantities of material that have to be secured (several hundred tons) (AIEA).
For these reasons, the Moroccan kingdom has taken an important step toward creating an independent
national agency, named the “Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security," per
law 142-12, which aims to enhance and strengthen the country’s nuclear security regime.
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B.

The Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety
and Security: Missions and Activities

AMSSNUR, or the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security, is an
independent agency responsible for establishing and designing national regulations on nuclear security,
safety, and the control of transports across Moroccan borders which contain sources of ionizing radiation.
The agency thus works to ensure high levels of safety and the protection of nuclear and radiological
material.

TRANSPORT SAFETY
AND SECURITY
NUCLEAR
SECURITY

RADIATION
PROTECTION

AMSSNUR

MANAGEMENT
WASTE

SAFEGUARD

SAFETY
Figure 1. Hierarchy of the Different Activities of AMSSNUR

C.

Law 142-12

Under the revision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Morocco has previously
established laws and regulations, such as the law of October 1971, which is the basic regulation against
ionizing radiation and which regulates radiation protection. Establishing and designing regulations is,
however, a primary responsibility of the state.
Furthermore, the enhancement and strengthening of the nuclear security regime is made possible by
designing and maintaining legislation that ensures a high level of physical protection of nuclear and
radiological material used within the state, based on a graded approach. Such legislation should take into
account the categorization of nuclear and radiological material and the evaluation of the threat.
For this reason, Morocco has created a new law, 142-12, concerning safety and security and based on the
international norms, regulations, and conventions of the IAEA.
The new law addresses the following topics:
● Authorization of the use of nuclear and radiological materials;
● Authorization for transporting nuclear and radiological materials domestically and
internationally;
● Waste management;
● Protection against the sources of ionizing radiation;
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●
●
●

V.

Enhancing the safety and security of nuclear and radiological materials, as well as nuclear
facilities;
Physical protection regimes for nuclear material during transport, use, and storage, and for
nuclear facilities;
Emergency planning;

Opportunities and challenges:
A.

Nuclear Terrorism and The Birth of Subnational Terrorist
Groups

The greatest challenges facing the safety and security of our nation are nuclear terrorism and the
development of the terrorist groups which could destroy populations by using nuclear devices. As Dr.
Yukiya Amano, director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said, “Terrorism is spreading and
the possibility of using nuclear material cannot be excluded.”
Assumptions that terrorists might use nuclear and radiological material to construct bombs should be
made in preventing such disasters. How to secure nuclear and radiological material in both private and
public society, as well as how to detect such material, especially from afar, should be taken into account
as well.

B.

Increase Education On Nuclear Security Culture and On
Nuclear Security and The Non-Proliferation:

The security of nuclear and radiological material calls for strong knowledge of nuclear security culture
and non-proliferation.
Conducting practical training on nuclear security and preventing insider and outsider threats is vital. As
such, the new Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security should, in cooperation
with the IAEA and WINS, create a national center for providing training for those involved in the use of
various radiological material.

C.

Establishing an Effective and Efficient Nuclear Security
Regulation:

Establishing effective and efficient nuclear security regulations and conventions is the first responsibility
of the new Moroccan Agency for Nuclear and Radiological Safety and Security.
Establishing conventions as to the secure transport of nuclear and radiological material under the new
agency will require the operator to ensure nuclear security measures during the transport, use, and storage
of nuclear and radiological material in Morocco.

D.

5-Year Plan for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in Morocco

In 2016, a young generation of professionals worldwide received a call from the nonpartisan policy
research center, The Stimson Center, in cooperation with UNSCR 1540, regarding how to prevent the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—requesting that professionals submit a 5-year plan for
preventing the proliferation of WMDs by examining their own or other countries.
I participated by developing and submitting a 5-year plan for Morocco on August 4, 2016. WMD
proliferation—such as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons—is a real threat posed to international
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security. Unfortunately, in recent years, nuclear terrorism has become a reality for us, and there are
numerous terrorists and extremists groups that are rising up around the world. Many of them, as well as
individual nations, aim to develop, obtain, and retain WMDs so as to destroy humanity and the
environment by using them in their attacks.
Since 1970, the treaty on non-proliferation has been in effect. It was created to prevent the spread of
WMDs so as to protect people and environments against the harmful effects that could result from the
uses of WMDs. The non-proliferation treaty is based on three principles, pillars that include: the nonproliferation, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and cooperation between the states.
In addition, a variety of nuclear materials used around the world—such as in the medical, industrial, and
food fields—have been designated as radiological materials that could be used to make a radiological
dispersal device (or a “dirty bomb”), and other nuclear fissile sources such as uranium and plutonium can
be used in nuclear reactors. However, it is essential to strengthen nuclear security measures in nuclear
facilities and in the organizations that work with nuclear material in order to protect the materials against
theft.
The table below lays out a 5-year plan established for the Kingdom of Morocco:
National Plan for the Kingdom of Morocco for the Implementation of Resolution UNSCR 1540 to
Prevent the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Table 2. 5-Year Plan Established to Prevent the Proliferation of Mass Destruction

Year
20162017

National Activity

National
Stakeholders

International
Stakeholders

UNSCR
1540

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security

IAEA Support and
Control

Technical
Support

3– Train a group of police forces
to protect the border of the state
aimed at combating the illicit
trafficking of radiological and
nuclear material

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security &
CNESTEN

IAEA Revision

4– Establish a guide and national
convention in nuclear security of
radioactive sources

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security

1– Adopt the international
regulations in nuclear security as
national regulations
2– Control the import/export of
radiological material by air

5– Inspect the national
organizations such as industrial
ones and private/public hospitals
using radiological and nuclear
material
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20172018

1– Safeguard all radiological
material used in the Moroccan
territory

2– Establish a national training
center of nuclear security

3– Repatriate category-1 and -2
radiological material

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security

IAEA inspection
and safeguarding

CNESTEN &
Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security
Ministry of Health

Support by the
international expert
collaborations,
U.S. Department

4– Secure and store used
radiological material
5– Create national center under
the Moroccan Agency for Nuclear
and Radiological Safety and
Security to secure radiological
material

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security

Report

WNTI, IAEA
Funding

Unit of the
Biological
Weapons
Convention in the
biological area
WNTI, IAEA

6– Create national center for
securing biological material
7– Establish a national regulation
in transport security of radioactive
and nuclear material
20182019

1– Ratify supplementary guidance
on the import/export of radioactive
sources regarding the code of
conduct on the safety and security
of the sources

2– Control the import/export of
radioactive material by sea

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security and
Tangier Med harbor;
Ministry of Health

IAEA support and
cooperation w/ the
World Health
Organization unit
of the biological
weapons and the
Organization for
the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons
in the chemical
area

Reporting

Cooperation

3– Train (in workshops) for
securing biological and chemical
material
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20192020

1– Train and exercise in transport
security of radioactive and nuclear
material

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security

IAEA
Collaboration and
Support, WNTI

Funding and
Support

2– Secure cooperation under the
African Regional Cooperative
Agreement for Research,
Development and Training related
to Nuclear Science and
Technology (AFRA)
3– Create national center to
control the import/export and use
of biological material

CNESTEN, Ministry
of Health

World Health
Organization,
IAEA

Report;
Funding and
Cooperation

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security; national
policy

Report

4– IAEA inspection and
safeguarding
5– Control sea border
20202021

1– Organize training in transport
security for police force

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security,
AMSSNUR, and
CNESTEN

IAEA support by
giving training
establishing an
education program

2– Develop a program of
collaboration and cooperation with
European nuclear security council

Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety
and Security,

PNS, WINS,
WNTI

3– Raise awareness about the
importance of nuclear security
among the university generation
and support the preparation of
PhDs in nuclear security

CNESTEN, &
AIGAM

4– Cooperate with other states to
combat nuclear terrorism

Ministry of
cooperation and
foreign affairs,
Moroccan Agency for
Nuclear and
Radiological Safety

Support by
changing
expert and
funding
support

Cooperation
and support
by group of
experts

Abbreviations:
IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency
WINS: World Institute for Nuclear Security
WNTI: World Nuclear Transport Institute
AIGAM: Moroccan Association of Engineers in Nuclear Engineering
CNESTEN: National Centre for Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology
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VI. Conclusion and Discussion:
To achieve a nuclear security regime for radioactive materials and associated facilities and activities,
Morocco should maintain the following objectives:
• Protection against unauthorized removal of radioactive materials used in associated facilities and
associated activities;
• Protection against sabotage involving radioactive materials, associated facilities, and associated
activities;
• Rapid and regulatory control of materials.

VII. Realization
These objectives call for the creation or enhancement of the legislative and regulatory framework
concerning the safety of radioactive materials and related facilities and activities in order to reduce the
likelihood of malicious acts.
The development of a nuclear security culture, the strengthening of the regulatory and legislative
frameworks, and the development of terrorism, which constantly changes its façades (and which could
take the form of aggression against facilities hosting nuclear or radioactive material, or an attack by
dispersal of radioactive or other material) make the international cooperation and coordination of
international technical nuclear security activities necessary. Such cooperation and coordination will, as
well, avoid duplication of efforts and control sensitive exports, reducing the risk that terrorists may have
access to materials, equipment, and technology involved in the development of weapons of mass
destruction. It will also strengthen computer security (e.g., protection of networks and sensitive
information). Lastly, human resources for the sustainable implementation of nuclear security measures
should be considered essential as well.
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